Countercyclical contingent capital (CCC): possible use and ideal design by Giuseppe De Martino et al.
Questioni di Economia e Finanza
(Occasional Papers)
Countercyclical contingent capital (CCC): 
possible use and ideal design






















0   Questioni di Economia e Finanza
(Occasional papers)
Number 71 – September 2010
Countercyclical contingent capital (CCC): 
possible use and ideal design
by Giuseppe De Martino, Massimo Libertucci, Mario Marangoni 
















 The  series  Occasional Papers presents studies and documents on issues pertaining to the 
institutional tasks of the Bank of Italy and the Eurosystem. The Occasional Papers appear alongside 
the Working Papers series which are specifically aimed at providing original contributions to economic 
research. 
 The  Occasional Papers include studies conducted within the Bank of Italy, sometimes in 
cooperation with the Eurosystem or other institutions. The views expressed in the studies are those of the 
authors and do not involve the responsibility of the institutions to which they belong. 
  The series is available online at www.bancaditalia.it.  COUNTERCYCLICAL CONTINGENT CAPITAL (CCC): 
POSSIBLE USE AND IDEAL DESIGN 
 
by 







Contingent capital – any debt instrument that converts into equity when a predefined 
event occurs – has received increasing attention as a viable tool for allowing banks to raise 
capital when needed at relatively more affordable prices than common equity. While the 
debate has focused on contingent capital for systemically important financial institutions, 
this paper concentrates on its possible use for covering capital needs arising from the 
implementation of countercyclical buffers. We propose the introduction of countercyclical 
contingent capital (CCC) based on a double trigger. The interaction of the two triggers 
would determine a quasi-default status. Conversion would be required when the financial 
system is simultaneously facing aggregate problems and the individual bank – while still in 
a going concern status – shows weaknesses. Building on this proposal, the paper tests how 
different double triggers would have worked in the past and discusses the optimal design of 
the conversion mechanism and prudential treatment. 
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1.  The rationale for contingent capital
1 
Academics and regulators have recently considered contingent capital – any debt 
instrument that converts into equity when a predefined event occurs – as a viable tool for 
allowing banks to raise capital at relatively more affordable prices than common equity. 
Recently, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (2009) and the European 
Commission (2010) have explicitly referred to the importance of reviewing the role that 
contingent capital could play in the new regulatory capital framework.   
This is not a new topic. A wide variety of forms of funding that – more or less 
automatically – either bear losses or convert to common equity at a predefined level of a 
given trigger have been proposed over the years. Since 2000, for instance, the reliance on 
subordinated notes and debentures has been advocated as a possible tool for improving 
market discipline of larger intermediaries and identifying market-based triggers for an 
effective and prompt corrective action (Flannery, 2005). The subscribers of subordinated 
debt would have strong incentives to monitor the operations of the issuer since their 
investment would be lost in the event of failure. 
There are several goals behind more recent proposals, including that of improving the 
levels and quality of bank capital, the provision of extra financial resources for systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs), and the development of credible countercyclical 
buffers.
2 The common driver is the belief that contingent capital can strengthen market 
discipline with respect to capital requirements, preventing excessive capital levels from 
reducing the use of debt as a disciplining device for banks’ managers. Having said this, it is  
fair to acknowledge that a second driver is to develop a capital tool that, while able to cover 
losses when needed, is less expensive for banks. Since post-crisis regulation is likely to 
insist on raising capital quality, there is clearly an appetite for instruments that – while 
satisfying supervisors’ requests – are also able to keep funding costs under control. 
Moreover, compared with subordinated debt, contingent capital would introduce a more 
balanced distribution of risks between bondholders and equity holders, as bonds run the risk 
of being converted into equity and shares of getting diluted.
3  
While the debate has focused on contingent capital for SIFIs, we concentrate instead on 
its possible use for covering capital needs arising from the implementation of 
countercyclical buffers. Indeed, the role of contingent capital in a countercyclical toolkit is, 
in our view, the most interesting open issue. This would mean that in good times banks 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to the following people for their useful comments: F. Cannata, F. Columba, A. Conciarelli, 
N. di Iasio, A. Enria, A. Generale, G. Mazzoni, F. Piersante, A. Pilati, C. Salleo and the participants at the 
Ceis - Tor Vergata Economics Foundation XXII Villa Mondragone International Economic Seminar. A final 
thank goes to Alice Chambers for the final revision of the paper. The opinions expressed are those of the 
authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
2 BCBS (2009). 
3 There is also scepticism about the introduction of capital instruments that can turn out to be overly complex 
(Goodhart, 2010).    6
would be allowed to issue contingent capital in order to build up the buffer; in bad times, 
contingent capital would be converted into common equity, thus providing banks with 
sufficient resources for avoiding a credit crunch. In our setting, while minimum capital 
requirements and regulatory capital remain the policy instruments for achieving 
microprudential stability, countercyclical buffers and (countercyclical) contingent capital 
are the instruments for pursuing the new macroprudential objectives put forward by the 
G20 leaders. 
The core of our proposal is the ex ante probability of conversion of countercyclical 
contingent capital (CCC): in order to be feasible, it should be lower than Tier1 hybrids, and 
ideally greater than Tier2 subordinated debt. This guarantees that the cost of CCC is in-
between Tier1 and Tier2 instruments. The purpose of the paper is to understand whether 
there is room for this kind of capital instrument and what the optimal design should be. We 
propose a double trigger in the conversion process from debt to equity. Conversion would 
be required when simultaneously: a) the financial system is facing problems, as predefined 
by some quantitative rule; and b) the individual bank – while still in a going concern status 
– shows weaknesses (for instance, in the form of a capital adequacy ratio below a 
predefined threshold, set above the minimum). The interaction of the two triggers would 
give rise to a ‘quasi-default’ status: the bank is still able to meet regulatory requirements 
with its current capital, but additional capital injections are needed as aggregate risk is 
increasing. We thus analyse how the two triggers should be calibrated and discuss the most 
suitable conversion rules and prudential treatment. 
Our proposal makes a clear distinction between microprudential and macroprudential 
policy objectives and, accordingly, a precise partition between regulatory capital and 
countercyclical contingent capital. Therefore, during a systemic crisis, it may happen that 
CCC is converted, while Tier1 subscribers are not affected at some banks; by the same 
token, in the event of idiosyncratic problems, CCC investors would be unaffected whereas 
Tier1 subscribers may bear losses. We believe that this is not a shortcoming, since the two 
tools face different risks: systemic (or macroprudential) risk the former, idiosyncratic (or 
microprudential) risk the latter.  
This approach has two advantages. First, it makes macroprudential policies more 
credible, since a specific macroprudential instrument would serve exclusively 
macroprudential targets. Second, the different scope of regulatory capital and CCC would 
reduce the risk of overly complex capital instruments, which may lead to regulatory 
circumvention and arbitrage.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the most recent proposals on 
contingent capital. Sections 3 and 4 describe the existing and forthcoming rules on 
supervisory capital as well as some examples of the concrete use of contingent capital. 
Section 5 assesses the various proposals and sets the stage for sections 6 and 7, which focus 
on the possible use of convertible debt as a complement to countercyclical capital buffers.   7
Section 8 discusses how the conversion mechanism should be designed and Section 9, the 
most suitable prudential treatment. Section 10 concludes. 
 
2.  A review of the proposals  
Several variants of contingent capital have been proposed over the years. The current 
debate focuses on forms of capital that – more or less automatically – convert to common 
equity at a given level of a predefined variable.
4 
There are a number of – not necessarily mutually exclusive – goals behind these 
proposals: the improvement of the levels and quality of bank capital, the provision of extra 
financial resources for SIFIs, and the development of credible countercyclical buffers. The 
common driver is the belief that contingent capital can add significant market discipline 
with respect to capital requirements, also preventing excessive levels of capital from 
reducing the use of debt as a disciplining device for banks’ managers.  
The idea of requiring banks to issue special capital instruments is not a new one. Since 
2000, particularly in the US, the issue of subordinated notes and debentures has been 
advocated as a valuable tool for improving market discipline of larger intermediaries and 
identifying market-based triggers for prompt supervisory corrective action. Some proposals 
envisage that subordinated debt, with sufficient long-term maturity, should represent a 
minimum share of a bank’s risk-weighted assets. The subscribers of subordinated debt 
would have an incentive to monitor the operations of the issuer since their investment 
would be wiped out in case of failure. In fact, subordinated debt holders, while unaffected 
in going concern scenarios, would bear losses in the case of default (‘gone concern’). 
However, the disciplining impact of subordinated debt is greatly reduced if there is an – 
even small – likelihood of public intervention during a crisis. Indeed, expectations of public 
bailout would limit the downside risk for subordinated bondholders. Since SIFIs are more 
likely to be bailed out with taxpayers money, this kind of mechanism would not meet its 
goals. Rational agents would require lower risk premia for subordinated bonds issued by 
SIFIs, thus creating an uneven playing field.  
The introduction of contingent capital could therefore be viewed as an evolution of 
subordinated debt, without its shortcomings. In its basic design, contingent capital is a 
hybrid security that contains triggers which convert it into common equity. The advantages 
of contingent capital are clear: while it would maintain the benefits of debt instruments, 
subscribers would be exposed to the consequences of excessive risk taking and would thus 
be more willing to monitor the firm; on the other hand, shareholders would also have a 
strong incentive to monitor risk exposures in order to avoid massive dilution when debt is 
converted to capital. In practice, the burden sharing largely depends on the conversion 
mechanism. 
                                                 
4 See Turner (2010) for an exhaustive survey.   8
As we mentioned earlier the main difference between the various proposals probably 
centres around the identification of the trigger variables (bank specific vs. aggregate or 
both) and the levels at which they are activated. The choice is (implicitly) driven by the 
goal of the tool.  
Flannery (2005), for instance, proposes the use of reverse convertible debentures 
triggered by a bank-specific variable. These bonds would be automatically converted into 
equity if the bank’s market capital ratio (equity’s market value over assets) fell below a 
predetermined level: neither the issuer nor the subscriber would have any option regarding 
the conversion. The risk of price manipulation by interested parties would be reduced by 
averaging market prices over a given time interval; this would also reduce potential noise in 
daily data. The focus is clearly on an idiosyncratic crisis. 
Conversely, Hancock and Passmore (2009) suggest mandatory convertible subordinated 
debt that banks would be required to issue in good times. This instrument would be 
subordinated to all other debt claims and would automatically convert into common equity 
during a systemic crisis. Therefore, they specify a single trigger that is totally independent 
from firm-specific risks and calibrated in order to be pulled very infrequently (once-in-a-
lifetime).  
A third option is to use a double trigger. The Squam Lake Working Group propose that 
banks issue mandatory long-term debt instruments in good times; during a crisis, they 
would be automatically converted into equity. Conversion would be determined subject to 
two conditions: a) the financial system incurred a systemic crisis, as announced by the 
supervisory authority; and b) a bank-specific variable – such as the capital adequacy ratio – 
is triggered. In their view, a double trigger is important for two reasons. First, if conversion 
is limited to the occurrence of systemic crises, the contingent capital will provide the same 
benefit – in terms of a disciplining factor for managers – as debt in all but the most extreme 
periods. Second, if conversion is only based on systemic triggers, even sound banks would 
be forced to convert in a crisis. Mc Donald (2010) also opts for a set of triggers which, 
however, rely on market-based indicators. Contingent capital would be converted if both 
the firm's stock price and a financial sector index drop below predefined values. In his 
view, market variables are preferable to accounting ratios because the latter are updated less 
frequently and are backward-looking; moreover, accounting rules may be subject to 
arbitrage.  
In terms of conversion, most of the proposals suggest that the share price at the time of 
conversion should be the strike price. According to Flannery (2005), this guarantees that 
subscribers lose no principal values upon conversion, while existing shareholders are 
diluted and must share the firms’ future cash flows with the new shareholders. However, 
conversions based on market prices can open the way to manipulation (Squam Lake, 2009). 
Contingent capital subscribers, for instance, might try to push the share price down so they 
would receive a larger share of the equity in the conversion. Moreover, there are also risks 
of death spirals: the risk of dilution of the existing shareholders may further depress the   9
share price, leading to more dilution, and so on and so forth. On the other hand, the use of 
average figures for market prices (e.g., the average share price over the past n days) may 
provide some incentives to existing shareholders to anticipate the conversion. Indeed, if the 
share price falls sharply during a crisis, shareholders may find it preferable to force 
conversion at a price that still looks acceptable. For these reasons, the Squam Lake Group 
proposes to convert each currency unit of debt into a fixed quantity of shares, rather than a 
fixed value of equity. A similar view is shared by Mc Donald (2010) who argues that the 
risk of manipulation is lower in the case of fixed share premium conversion schemes. 
 
3.  Rules   
The purpose of regulatory capital is to absorb banks’ unexpected losses, i.e. those losses 
that the bank has not foreseen in the normal course of business. Traditionally, prudential 
regulation has identified two components of regulatory capital: 
  Tier1 capital, which absorbs losses on a going concern basis, allowing an institution 
to continue its activities and helping to prevent insolvency; and 
  Tier2 capital, which absorbs losses on a gone concern basis, helping to ensure that 
depositors and senior creditors can be repaid should a default occur.  
Under the current standard, banks can hold as little as 2 per cent common equity (i.e., 
ordinary shares and retained earnings) to risk-weighted assets. As a consequence, some 
banks have recorded strong Tier1 ratios with limited loss absorption. Against this 
background, in 2009 the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed a 
new – and stricter – definition of regulatory capital. Specific criteria have accordingly been 
identified to ensure that Tier1 and Tier2 instruments are actually able to absorb losses on a 
going and gone concern basis, respectively. 
To this end, common equity is recognized as the highest-quality component of capital: as 
such, it must represent the predominant form of Tier1 capital.
5 Non-common equity 
elements can also be included – within limits – in Tier1 capital provided they absorb losses 
while the bank remains a going concern. In particular, qualifying instruments must provide 
the bank with permanent resources and be capable of absorbing losses in practice without 
exacerbating a bank’s condition in a crisis. In that respect, contingent capital seems to find 
some room in Tier1 to the extent that it meets – along with other eligibility criteria – 
principal loss absorption through either (i) conversion to common shares at an objective 
pre-specified trigger point or (ii) a write-down mechanism, which allocates losses to the 
instrument at a pre-specified trigger point.  
                                                 
5 Common equity is subordinated to all other elements of funding, absorbs losses and has full flexibility of 
dividend payments.   10
As for the gone concern capital, the structure of Tier2 capital is simplified: all Tier2 
instruments should be subordinated to depositors and creditors and have an original 
maturity of at least 5 years. No specific mention of contingent capital is made. 
In Europe the potential of contingent capital has been recognized in the amendments to 
the Directive 2009/111/EC on capital requirements (the “CRD2”). This considers as 
eligible in Tier1 hybrid capital instruments that convert to common equity in either 
emergency situations or at the discretion of supervisory authorities, based on the 
institution's financial and solvency position. This is an example of the use of contingent 
capital for going concern purposes.  
Some details on how Tier1 hybrids work have been provided by the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS, 2009). According to CEBS guidelines, an 
emergency situation occurs at least when the bank is in breach of minimum capital 
requirements (i.e., 4 per cent Tier1 capital ratio and 8 per cent total capital ratio). 
Competent authorities may set higher limits, either on a general basis (i.e., for all 
institutions) or for single institutions. The definition of the emergency situation is clearly 
still close to a going concern scenario, particularly if limits are higher than the regulatory 
minima. Independently of the existence of an emergency situation, supervisors can trigger 
conversion at their discretion. Hence, contractual clauses cannot prevent the competent 
authority from exercising this option, while the issuer may have the option to convert at any 
time. Needless to say, the focus is on idiosyncratic events. 
 
4.  Practices 
The use of contingent capital has been limited to date. This explains why the issuances 
of contingent debt by Lloyds banking Group (LBG) and Rabobank have become popular 
case studies (Table 1).  
In November 2009 LBG announced a capital plan designed to increase core capital and 
exit the UK Government Asset Protection Scheme. One component of this transaction was 
a £7 billion Liability Management Exercise available to holders of certain outstanding 
Tier1 and Upper Tier2 instruments (existing securities) according to which – among other 
transactions – holders were offered a par-for-par exchange into LBG enhanced capital notes 
(ECN) carrying a coupon equal to the coupon of the existing securities (fixed rate or 
floating rate for life depending on the existing securities), plus a premium. The ECNs 
represent a new contingent capital instrument in the form of a lower Tier2 dated 
subordinated note with bullet maturities of at least 10 years, no issuer call and no coupon 
deferral. They are mandatorily convertible into a pre-determined number of LBG ordinary 
shares
6 upon breach of a minimum 5 per cent Core Tier1 ratio. For regulatory purposes the 
                                                 
6 Any investor who does not have the capacity to hold ordinary shares will have the ability to receive the cash 
equivalent of the ordinary shares upon conversion.   11
instrument is treated as Tier2 for ongoing capital adequacy calculations; it has been granted 
Core Tier1 quality for stress test capital calculations, meaning that it can be counted as 
Core Tier1 when assessing the bank’s capital adequacy in the stress test exercise required 
by the UK regulator.  
In March 2010, Rabobank also announced its intention to issue a senior contingent note. 
The scheme differs substantially from the Lloyds’ ECNs since, until conversion, the 
proposed notes are senior unsecured bank debt, ranking senior to all subordinated capital of 
Rabobank (i.e., it is unlikely to benefit from any regulatory capital recognition). Also the 
trigger and the consequences of the materialization of the triggering event are different. The 
trigger resembles the Core Tier1 ratio, even though the definition of equity is the 
accounting – not the prudential – one (i.e., membership certificates and retained earnings). 
Should the bank’s equity/RWA ratio fall below 7 per cent, the instruments would not be 
converted, but they would be written down to 25 per cent of face value. The capital gain 
generated by the redemption at a discount of the instruments will serve to increase the 
bank’s capital base through an increase in reserves. 
 
Table 1 - Main characteristics of some outstanding contingent capital issuances 
Issuer   Lloyds Rabobank 
Denomination  Enhanced Capital Note (ECN)  Senior Contingent Notes (SCN) 
Maturity  Minimum 10 years  10 years 
Coupon 
Premium of 1.5% – 2.5 % above the rate of 
the respective security being exchanged 
(approx. 10.15%) 
6.875% 
Coupon deferral/cancellation  None  None 
Conversion trigger  Core Tier1<5%  Equity/RWA <7% 
Conversion price/write-down 
rate 
LBG share price at issuance 
75% permanent write-down; 25% plus 
accrued interest is paid back to the 
holder 
Post-conversion status  Ordinary shares  Reserves  
Ranking before conversion  Pari passu with Lower Tier2 




Lower Tier2 (core Tier1 for the purposes of  
FSA stress test) 
No recognition for regulatory purposes 
 
In terms of conversion mechanisms, for LBG the conversion price has been set at 
issuance (more precisely, it is the share value at the end of the exchange offer period). This 
implies that dilution is limited to a pre-defined fixed number of shares and investors have 
full equity downside risk since the beginning. The ECN is therefore expected to have a 
yield close to Tier1. In the case of Rabobank, as there is no issuance of shares or other 
capital instruments, there is no dilution for existing shareholders; the investors of senior 
contingent notes have no potential to receive any upside after the trigger is activated. This 
suggests that the instrument should receive a substantial premium over senior unsecured 
instruments.   12
 
5.  An assessment of the proposals 
In the previous sections, we described how many debt instruments can be found under 
the common label ‘contingent capital’.  
From a going concern perspective, triggers are typically bank specific and generally 
linked to some measures of solvency (for instance the Tier1 ratio). As we mentioned above, 
there are clearly limits in these kinds of triggers. A rule-based trigger may be manipulated 
and existing shareholders may decide to opt out in order to avoid dilution once a bank 
begins to get into trouble. Conversely, a trigger based on supervisory discretion may 
encourage forbearance and provide market participants with inaccurate signals, possibly 
giving rise to alarm and increasing the likelihood of self-fulfilling crisis episodes.  
There is also a lively debate on the possible role of contingent capital in a gone concern 
scenario. Compared with other bondholders, subscribers of subordinated debt require 
higher risk premia, since they bear losses in the case of default. As such, Tier2 subordinated 
debt is an efficient component of a bank’s capital structure and, apparently, there is no need 
for contingent capital. However, this is only true for not too-big-to fail institutions. In the 
case of SIFIs, liquidation does not take place since this is typically anticipated (and thus 
avoided) by public bailouts. Therefore, subordinated debt holders do not bear (and do not 
expect to bear) any loss and they do not require higher risk premia. In other words, the 
distinction between going and gone concern is not meaningful since it fails to acknowledge 
that SIFIs never go through a ‘formal’ default status. 
There are three undesired corollaries: i) SIFIs can raise capital at a lower cost than other 
institutions; ii) taxpayers have to bear those losses that are not covered by subordinated 
debt; iii) market discipline is reduced since subordinated debt-holders have no incentive to 
monitor shareholders and common shareholders monitor managers less effectively since 
they also benefit from the peculiar position of subordinated debt-holders. This increases 
moral hazard. 
For these reasons we believe that gone concern scenarios should also include public 
bailouts and some form of contingent capital might be a useful tool for SIFIs. To be drastic, 
SIFIs should not be allowed to include subordinated debt in Tier2 capital, since it would 
never be activated for covering gone concern losses. Rather, we believe that contingent 
capital should be seen as a (more credible) variant of subordinated debt, which guarantees 
that subscribers do bear losses as in the case of not too-big-to-fail institutions.  
6.  Contingent capital and countercyclical buffers 
Notwithstanding undeniable implementation issues, the use of contingent capital for 
dealing with idiosyncratic problems is conceptually clear. Indeed, the BCBS (2010b) has 
recently proposed to enhance the entry criteria of regulatory capital to ensure that all   13
eligible instruments issued by banks are capable of absorbing losses when a bank becomes 
non-viable. 
We are much more interested in understanding whether there is also a possible role as a 
countercyclical tool. Indeed, since the new regulation is likely to insist on raising capital 
quality, there is interest in instruments that – while satisfying supervisors’ requests – are 
also able to keep funding costs under control. In particular, there is great appetite for forms 
of contingent capital to be used for meeting countercyclical buffers. In this framework, in 
good times banks would be allowed to issue contingent capital in order to build up their 
capital buffer; in bad times, contingent capital would be converted into common equity, 
thus providing banks with sufficient resources for avoiding a credit crunch in the real 
sector.  
At first glance, it is arguable that countercyclical buffers do serve to ensure that banks 
remain well capitalized in times of economic downturn and accordingly do not reduce the 
amount of credit. As it has to bear the increase in losses due to the downturn, the buffer 
should be covered with common equity. This does not leave a lot of room for contingent 
capital. 
However, in our view this does not necessarily imply that contingent capital cannot be 
used for countercyclical purposes. Rather, we believe that introducing countercyclical 
contingent capital (CCC) would establish a clear distinction between microprudential and 
macroprudential policy objectives and, accordingly, a precise partition between regulatory 
capital and CCC.
7 To that end, however, we need to identify a trigger (or a set of triggers) 
which guarantees that the ex ante probability of conversion of countercyclical contingent 
capital (CCC) is lower than for Tier1 hybrids and, ideally, greater than for Tier2 
subordinated debt (assuming that an idiosyncratic gone concern status represents a floor on 
the probability of bearing losses). If this trigger can be found, the ex ante risk premia and 
pricing of the different instruments can be determined according to the probability of 
conversion.  
Against this background, one potentially workable design could be based on a double 
trigger, as suggested by the Squam Lake Working Group. Conversion would be required 
when simultaneously: a) the financial system is facing aggregate problems as predefined by 
some quantitative rule; and b) the single bank – while still in a going concern status – 
shows weaknesses (for instance, in the form of a capital adequacy ratio below a predefined 
threshold, set above the minimum). The interaction of the two triggers would determine a 
quasi-default status: the bank is still able to meet regulatory requirements, but a need for 
additional capital injection emerges since generalized problems are incoming (Table 2). In 
other words, our scenario is based on systemic distress, which is more likely to affect 
                                                 
7 See Libertucci and Quagliariello (2010).   14




Table 2 – Possible use of contingent capital 
  Going Concern  Gone Concern 
“Quasi gone concern” 
(Countercyclical buffer)   
Predefined 
Trigger 
Bank specific: Solvency ratio 
below a threshold T or authority 
decision 
Bank specific: Liquidation 
or public bailout 
Double trigger: problematic banks 
(solvency ratio < C ≥ T or authority 









Tier1 hybrids  Tier2 contingent capital 
Countercyclical contingent capital 
(CCC) 
 
This setting ensures ex ante consistency across capital tools, but it does not prevent 
seniority from being violated ex post. In other words, it may still happen that the double 
trigger is pulled in some states of the world, so that countercyclical contingent capital is 
converted, while Tier1 subscribers are not affected. By the same token, in the case of 
idiosyncratic problems, Tier1 subscribers may bear losses while CCC investors would be 
unaffected. We believe that this is not a major issue, since the two capital tools are 
supposed to face different risks: systemic (or macroprudential) risk the former, 
idiosyncratic (or microprudential) risk the latter. Much more debatable is whether, in 
practice, this combination of triggers can occur. The risk is clearly that of identifying a 
quasi-default status that is so improbable as to make the use of contingent capital futile. The 
next section is therefore devoted to some simulations based on different possible triggers. 
 
7.  Designing the trigger for countercyclical contingent capital 
 Data 
Our simulations focus on eight countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, 
the UK, the US) over the period 1994-2009. This ensures that the functioning of CCC is 
tested for jurisdictions with different regulatory frameworks and financial markets. We 
select the top 15 banks in terms of total assets for each country at the end of each year.
9 
This means that our sample is not constant over time, but mimics the structure of the 
banking systems at any point in time. On average, the turnover is material, since each bank 
is present in the dataset for about 7 years (Table 3). 
    
Table 3 – Banks’ turnover 
Country  CA DE ES FR GB IT JP US  Total 
Avg years  7.4 5.9 7.9 6.7 7.2 6.2 5.9 7.1  6.8 
                                                 
8 For a discussion on the arguments against systemic triggers, see IIF (2010). 
9 The sample excludes some major American investment banks, which are classified as securities firms.    15
 
Having said this, we still believe this is the right way to proceed given our goal. While a 
balanced panel would allow us to follow each bank over time, results would be affected by 
important structural changes – particularly the consolidation process – in virtually all the 
countries considered in the analysis. Moreover, the use of pro-forma data would not be 
appropriate for designing ‘what if’ regulatory scenarios: what we want to look at is the 
possible impact of contingent capital on real banks, not on pro-forma institutions.  
Our initial dataset contains 15 banks per year per country, totalling about 1,700 records; 
since banks whose accounting data are missing are excluded, the number of observations in 
the final dataset is slightly lower. Data for 1994-96 tend to be less reliable and deserve 
some caution. Similarly, 2009 data are incomplete, particularly for some countries.  
Quarterly data on GDP are from the OECD statistics. Market data and other financial 
variables – both bank-specific variables and system-wide indicators – are from Thomson-
Reuters Datastream; accounting data are from Bureau van Dijk Bankscope. While the 
former are available at any desired frequency, the time series of the latter are annual only, 
at least for the earlier years. Therefore, market-based indicators are computed at a monthly 
frequency, while accounting ratios are annual. This is not ideal, since triggers for 
contingent capital should be monitored more frequently than once a year; however, we 
prefer to maximize the length of the time series rather than the frequency of the data.  
Table 4 shows the possible triggers and describes how they are computed. As for the 
accounting bank-specific variables, we use the Basel Tier1 ratio, total capital ratio as well 
as the ratio of equity to total assets (a sort of leverage ratio for on-balance-sheet items), and 
the return on equity (ROE). They are all based on end-year data. 
 
Table 4 – Possible triggers 
Variable  Acronym Description 
Micro-triggers:    
Tier1 ratio  T1R  Ratio of Tier1 capital to Risk Weighted Assets 
Total capital ratio  TCR  Ratio of Total capital to Risk Weighted Assets 
Leverage ratio  ETA  Ratio of Equity to Total assets 
Return on equity  ROAE  Return on average equity 
Abnormal return (3 months)  Delta3m  Bank-j return minus bank index return over 3 months  
Abnormal return (1 month)  Delta1m  Bank-j return minus bank index return over 1 month 
Abnormal return (2 weeks)  Delta2w  Bank-j return minus bank index return over 2 weeks  
 
Macro-triggers:    
Banking index return (3 months)  Indren3m  Stock-market national bank index return over 3 months 
Banking index return (1 month)  Indren1m  Stock-market national bank index return over 1 month  
Banking index return (2 weeks)  Indren2w  Stock-market national bank index return over 2 weeks  
GDP gap  Hp_gap  Gross domestic product deviation from long term time trend (HP 
filtered series). 
Normalized real interbank rate  Ib3cpr  3-month real interbank rate (difference between nominal rate and CPI), 
over one-side long-term average 
Normalized 10 year- 3 month spread S103r  Spread between the return of 10 year bond and 3 month bond, over one-
side long-term average   16
 
As for market-based bank-specific variables, we compute the abnormal returns (i.e. the 
difference between the return of each bank and the return of the Thomson-Reuters 
Datastream national banking index) over different time horizons (3 months, 1 month, 2 
weeks). 
With respect to absolute returns, the abnormal returns enable the idiosyncratic 
determinants of a bank’s problem to be captured more effectively.
10 Wider time horizons 
tend to reduce the likelihood of trigger manipulation, since it can become very costly for 
arbitrageurs; however, this bears a cost in terms of the delay in transmitting distress signals. 
Therefore, in the next section we focus on the 2-week horizon, as Flannery does (2010).  
For the macro-trigger, we start with the returns of the domestic banking indexes over 
different time horizons (3 months, 1 month, 2 weeks). We then move towards more 
genuinely macroeconomic indicators. We use the deviation of GDP from its trend, the real 
interbank rate over its long-term average and the spread between the return on 10-year and 
3-month sovereign bonds over its long-term average.  
Figure 1 depicts the dynamics of the accounting triggers for each country.  
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10 See, among others, Cannata and Quagliariello (2005). We have excluded the volatilities since they are not 
easy to calibrate and their interpretation is not intuitive. CDS spreads – a popular early warning indicator – are 
also not included in the analysis. The reason is twofold: first, CDS markets are not always deep in all 
countries; second, the time series are not long enough.   17
The data highlight significant jumps for some time series and for certain countries (e.g., 
the equity to total ratio for Canadian banks in 2004). This is very often due to a few, 
specific observations. However, overly severe data cleaning may jeopardize the very core 
of the analysis – troubled banks – which are not easy to distinguish from ‘authentic’ 
outliers. Looking at the prudential variables, the levels are different due to heterogeneous 
eligibility criteria for capital instruments. For instance, banks in Canada, the US and the 
UK show persistently higher capital ratios.  
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the banking index return over a two-week time horizon. 
 
Figure 2 – Example of a macro-trigger 
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Probability of conversion 
In order to assess how different double triggers would have worked in the past, we run 
several simulations. While the results may be affected by the scarcity of data and the lack of 
a counterfactual, they provide an overview of the possible functioning of CCC. 
For the analysis of the probability of conversion, we interpolate monthly data. In 
practice, we assume sticky bank-specific accounting variables (Tier1 ratio, total capital 
ratio, ROE and leverage ratio): they stay at the December figures for all the months in a 
given year. GDP gap, which can be computed on a quarterly basis, stays at its quarter-end 
figures during all months of a given quarter.  
Under these approximations, we consider the double trigger infringed if both the bank-
specific trigger and the macro-trigger simultaneously drop below the threshold in any one 
month of the year. We can therefore check how often a pair of triggers – bank specific and 
aggregate – would have been pulled in the 16 years under examination. In order to cope 
with banks for which the double trigger was activated more that once during a given year, 
we control out for infra-annual duplications at individual bank level, by considering   18
exclusively the first hit in a year. The exclusion of all duplicated annual records reduces the 
degree of over-estimation conversion probabilities. 
Table 5 (panels a-h) reports the outcome of this exercise for different triggers and 
various thresholds. The calibration of the thresholds is based on the descriptive statistics 
and on some expert judgment.
11 For the sake of comparability, we used the same thresholds 
for all countries. 
  
Table 5 about here 
 
We interpret the historical frequency of breaches as the ex ante probability of being 
converted using a double trigger. For instance, for Italy (Panel a), the joint probability of a 
bank showing a total capital ratio below 9 per cent and the bank index return being below 
2.5 per cent over a two-week horizon is 26 per cent. Turning to the Tier1 ratio as micro 
variable, the joint probability would be 20 per cent when this trigger is set at 6 per cent and 
5 per cent when the threshold is 5 per cent. Looking at the interaction between the Tier1 
ratio and GDP gap – a couple of indicators which have the advantage of being very easy to 
interpret – the probability of conversion is 3.7 per cent when thresholds are 5 per cent and 0 
per cent (i.e., a positive output gap) respectively. 
In order to understand the drivers of this outcome, the figures on the joint probabilities 
can be compared with the ‘unconditional’ probabilities of the two separate triggers. As far 
as the total capital ratio is concerned, the probability of not meeting a 9 per cent threshold is 
26 per cent; running the same exercise for Tier1 ratio, probabilities are lower (20 and 5 per 
cent for thresholds equal to 6 and 5 per cent respectively). Not surprisingly, Tier1 is likely 
to be more informative than total capital ratio in terms of ability to signal bank problems.  
The unconditional probabilities of pulling market-based indicators tend to be very high. 
For Italy, the probability of the index falling to more than -2.5 percent for at least 2 weeks 
over one year is 100 percent. This outcome is linked to the calibration of the simulation: a 
scenario of at least one bearish period (2 weeks, 1 month or 3 months respectively) in the 
whole year is likely to happen. In turns, these results highlight the importance of a careful 
calibration of the thresholds, which are probably too benign in our exercise. They also point 
to the role of the interplay between bank specific and aggregate triggers in the design of 
CCC.  
Overall, in continental European countries, the double trigger based on the total capital 
ratios would be hit quite often, making contingent capital rather unappealing for 
subscribers. Again, the Tier1 ratio seems to be a much more reliable indicator; also, taken 
at their face value, these results suggest that a threshold at about 5 per cent can represent a 
suitable compromise (obviously under current capital regulation).  
                                                 
11 See Claessens et al. (2010) for a discussion of the topic.   19
By contrast, prudential triggers are virtually never pulled for Canadian, US and UK 
intermediaries. Indeed, US major banks have historically shown high capital ratios, due to 
different eligibility standards across countries.
12 In that respect, pending new Basel rules on 
regulatory capital, market-based triggers may be a valuable alternative for those 
intermediaries. On the other hand, this may also indicate that a country-specific calibration 
of the trigger values would be more adequate than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.  
Similar results also hold when macroeconomic variables are used along with accounting 
ratios. For instance, a double trigger based on a Tier1 ratio below 5 per cent and GDP just 
below its trend shows a probability of being pulled equal to 5.8 per cent in Germany and 
1.7 per cent in France (as against 3.7 per cent in Italy). Again, the probability of conversion 
is virtually zero in the US, Canada and the UK due to the dynamics of the capital ratios. 
Japan represents an outlier as the result of the ‘lost decade’ following the banking crisis in 
the 1990s.  
Clearly, the milder the scenario, the higher the conversion probabilities, but the lower 
the potential losses for subscribers. By contrast, for very severe scenarios, the probability of 
conversion is extremely low, virtually zero, but subscribers may expect to bear losses upon 
conversion, depending also on the chosen conversion mechanism.
13 In our view, this is the 
main driver for choosing the preferred combination of thresholds. Needless to say, this also 
largely depends on the role and functioning of the countercyclical buffer that contingent 
capital is supposed to cover. We will discuss this in the next section.  
 
 Timing of conversion 
What we have learnt in the previous section is the frequency of breaches of the trigger in 
terms of year/bank observations. However, we cannot assess whether this is due to the same 
bank over different years or different banks at a given point in time. The probability can be 
only considered an average probability on breaches for a given country, but no information 
on the cross-sectional dispersion can be inferred. 
In this section, we examine when the triggers would have been hit in the past. Ideally, 
CCC should convert when bad times are approaching. To address this point, we analyse 
when a given combination of triggers would have determined a conversion. Figure 3 shows 
the results, at country level, based on four different combinations of triggers: 
-  A: Tier1 ratio below 5 per cent and GDP below its trend; 
                                                 
12 Standard & Poor’s (2009) argue that a big question for contingent capital is how the conversion trigger 
levels are set. Since capital ratios are typically not strictly comparable, they expect that any specific threshold 
could mean different things to different issuers. 
13 Since the abnormal return is affected, by construction, by the return of the bank index, the calibration 
should prevent an excessively severe calibration of both triggers from determining no conversion event. 
Therefore, if the scenario for the bank index is particularly severe, the threshold for the abnormal return 
should be set at a relatively low level.      20
-  B: Tier1 ratio below 5 per cent and banking index return below -2.5 per cent; 
-  C: two-week abnormal return below -6 per cent and a 1.5 GDP gap; 
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At first sight,
14 the combination between a market-based trigger and a macroeconomic 
trigger (C) seems to work more accurately, determining most of the conversion in severe 
economic recession episodes. Similarly, market-based triggers – even when roughly 
calibrated (D) – work fairly well, determining most of the conversions in market crisis 
times. By contrast, the dynamics of the double trigger based on prudential indicators is less 
clear-cut.  
The aptitude of different indicators in successfully identifying troubled banks is also 
key. For this reason, we examine the ability of the different double triggers to successfully 
identify those banks that faced a situation of distress in the period from 2007-09. Drawing 
                                                 
14 The dynamic of Japanese indicators shows some peculiarities, in the form of higher-than-average numbers 
of entries: an exhaustive explanation of the causes of this behaviour, exploring the roots of Japanese banking 
sector weakness and its linkages with the country’s overall economic conditions, can be found in Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009).   21
on Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Borio and Drehmann (2009), we limit our exercise 
to two aspects: i) the ability to identify poorly performing banks, and ii) the cost of 
generating false alarms. In that respect, one has to trade off between Type I error (that is, 
not converting when needed) and Type II error (that is, converting when not required). The 
size of Type I and Type II error crucially depends on the calibration of the thresholds. A 
benign calibration is likely to identify many troubled banks, but at the cost of a lot of noise 
in terms of false alarms. On the other hand, an excessively severe calibration increases the 
accuracy, in terms of lower proportion of false signals, but at the risk of missing situations 
when conversion would be required.  
We leverage on Laeven and Valencia (2010) for the definition of troubled banks. 
According to this approach, a distressed intermediary: i) operates in a country where there 
are significant signs of distress in the banking system; ii) did benefit from significant 
banking policy intervention measures. This definition is close to our quasi-default status, 
even though the micro-conditions are tighter than in our approach (where the banks are still 
in a going concern status). In 2007-09, they identify 5 countries with distressed banking 
sectors (France, Germany, Spain, the UK, the US); in these countries, they list 8 distressed 
banks.
15 We use this list of banks to analyse the performance of the four double triggers.  
Results show how prudential-based triggers (versions A and B) would have been pulled 
for 4 banks only: one of them is a distressed bank according to Laeven and Valencia. 
Market-based triggers (versions C and D) would be triggered more often. Trigger C would 
have determined 25 conversions in 2008 and 20 in 2009: 4 distressed banks are captured 
among these observations. Finally, trigger D would have determined a lower total number 
of conversions (11 in 2008 and 7 in 2009), correctly identifying 4 distressed banks.
16  
To interpret these results, it is important to pay particular attention to the criterion of 
‘optimality’ an indicator must have.
17 The reason is that the weight assigned to the risk of 
missing a ‘quasi-default’ situation may be higher than that of calling those when they do 
not eventually occur. If policy makers’ first concern is to avoid under-capitalized banks 
when a systemic crisis is approaching, the preferences would go to an instrument that is 
able to identify troubled banks, even at the cost of high noise (in terms of a high number of 
                                                 
15 These are: BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Dexia, Royal Bank of Scotland, LBG, Northern Rock, Bradford 
& Bingley and Citigroup. These banks are reported by Laeven and Valencia (2010) in the list of direct fiscal 
outlays, recoveries and asset guarantees during the years 2007-09.  
16 The definition of distressed bank is very tight. These results can thus overestimate Type II error since some 
‘triggered’ banks, while not subject to bailouts or other policy measures, may have actually faced problems 
during the crisis. As a matter of fact, this analysis decisively depends on the list of distressed banks adopted as 
a control sample. The performance of the double triggers might increase the relaxation of the definition of 
distressed banks.  
17 This is in line with, among others, Borio and Drehmann (2009).   22
incorrect conversions).
 18 In our example, market-based triggers appear to perform better in 
this respect.  
 
 Case studies 
In order to show how CCC would perform at bank level in ‘real life’ situation, we 
present four case studies. These examples mimic the functioning of CCC for four different 
banks, with two selection criteria: geo-political background (UK, US and Canada vs. 
continental European country) and performance during the last financial crisis (that is, 
institutions which according to Leaven and Valencia (2010) were sound vs. distressed 
banks, those directly involved in a systemic banking crisis episode). We limit our exercise 
to the four different versions of double trigger examined above. The result of the case 
studies analysis is described in Figures 4 to 7.  
The charts describe the dynamic of both micro- and macro-trigger variables for a given 
bank. Moreover, for the threshold values used before in Figure 3, they highlight periods 
where the double trigger would have been pulled.  
 
 
Figure 4 – Poorly performing bank (UK) 
Solid lines represent micro variable (lhs) and macro variable (rhs) levels; dotted lines refer to trigger values; shaded areas represent periods in which double trigger was pulled



































































































































































































































                                                 
18 McDonald (2010) underlines how this is particularly true of contingent capital: if it converts when not 
required, then the bank is – by definition – healthy and, in an efficient market setting, it should be able to 
repurchase the newly converted shares, funding it by a new issuance of contingent capital.   23
Figure 5 – Poorly performing bank (France) 
Solid lines represent micro variable (lhs) and macro variable (rhs) levels; dotted lines refer to trigger values; shaded areas represent periods in which double trigger was pulled

































































































































































































































Figure 6 – Sound bank (UK) 
Solid lines represent micro variable (lhs) and macro variable (rhs) levels; dotted lines refer to trigger values; shaded areas represent periods in which double trigger was pulled
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Figure 7 – Sound bank (Germany) 
Solid lines represent micro variable (lhs) and macro variable (rhs) levels; dotted lines refer to trigger values; shaded areas represent periods in which double trigger was pulled






















































































































































































































































The results of the case studies provide messages that are consistent with the ones already 
described. First, the data confirm that triggers based on Tier1 ratio are pulled extremely 
rarely: in all four examples, they would never be activated. More specifically, this result 
applies both to sound banks (as expected) and to poorly performing banks, confirming the 
findings of the previous sections about the rarity of their activation. 
On the other hand, market-based indicators successfully identify poorly performing 
banks’ distress situations, irrespective of their geo-political background. However, this 
accuracy does not come without a cost: in this example, represented by the false alarm for 
the UK sound bank. 
 
 Policy implications 
Our analysis offers two insights. First, bank-specific market triggers appear to work 
relatively better than accounting ones, particularly in some countries. The better 
performance of market-based indicators must, however, be traded-off with greater volatility 
and the risk of manipulation. Moreover, the scarce liquidity and efficiency of financial 
markets in some countries may limit a widespread use of such triggers. Regarding their 
ability to identify systemic crisis episodes, it seems that they work appropriately, although 
determining a high number of conversions and thus acting as an excessively blunt 
instrument.  
Second, the frequency of triggers’ monitoring does matter and may entail significantly 
different probabilities of conversion. In real life, while banks are required to meet minimum   25
capital requirements at any time, prudential ratios are made available to supervisors on a (at 
most) quarterly basis (and can be lagging indicators). Therefore, one possible option is for 
authorities to monitor the evolution of the macro-triggers and, when they signal incoming 
distress, require banks to transmit information on the prudential ratios. This may not be 
very practical, though. Otherwise, any monitoring must necessarily be carried out on a 
quarterly basis. In that respect, it is clear that the use of micro-triggers based on market 
indicators may be very appealing if timeliness is a top priority.   
While these results are preliminary and are affected by various approximations, they 
somehow challenge the use of prudential ratios as a micro-component of the double trigger. 
Moreover, the analysis shows that CCC triggers may be difficult to calibrate, particularly if 
cross-border comparability is a priority for regulators.  
Much more investigation is needed on these issues. 
 
8.  The definition of conversion mechanisms 
The conversion mechanism of contingent capital is another important determinant of its 
marketability. In fact, the conversion rate determines the number of common shares that the 
holders of convertible debt receive when the triggering event occurs. The conversion rate 
accordingly determines the share of losses that subscribers and existing shareholders bear.
19  
The number of shares received by the holder of contingent capital can be either: a) 
prefixed at issuance; or b) determined at the time of conversion. The choice very much 
depends on the policy objectives and, particularly, on which stakeholders are to be 
punished more for their role in determining the event that pulled the trigger. 
Conversion into a number of shares prefixed at issuance. The number of shares received 
by the CCC holders when conversion is triggered could be determined by dividing:  
1.  the par value of the instrument by the share price of the bank at the time of issuance 
of the instrument. 
This option implies a fixed number of shares agreed when the capital instrument is issued. 
In terms of impact on the stakeholders, this is a rather extreme solution. This mechanism 
implies that debt holders receive a predefined number of shares. Suppose that a bank has 
issued a 20-years, 1,000 euros par value bond; at time of issuance, the stock price of the 
bank is 50 euros; debt holders know from the outset that they will receive 20 shares (1,000 / 
50) upon conversion. The distribution of penalties is very burdensome for them. Now, 
assume that the share price at conversion has dropped to 25 euros, converted debt holders 
will receive 20 shares in any event, bearing losses as if they had been shareholders from the 
beginning. By contrast, shareholders are better off: upon conversion, they are diluted to a 
limited and predefined extent and they share losses with fixed-income investors. For these 
                                                 
19 The drawbacks of this incentive structure are highlighted by Sundaresan and Wang (2010).   26
reasons, this instrument would be rather expensive and its cost much more closely 
correlated to the cost of equity.
20 
This option may potentially increase market discipline, since convertible debt holders 
would also have strong incentives to monitor the bank. A potential drawback, however, is 
that this mechanism may imply contagion among different categories of investors. The 
stability of fixed-income investors that subscribed to contingent capital may be jeopardized. 
From a governance perspective, it is not clear why debt holders should be penalized as 
much as shareholders.  
Conversion into a number of shares defined at the time of conversion. The number of 
shares to be given to the bond-holder may be determined by dividing:  
2.  the par value of the instrument by the share price of the bank at the time of 
conversion; 
3.  the par value of the instrument by the book value per common share at the time of 
conversion; 
In option 2, when the conversion is triggered, if the share price of the bank has dropped 
(as it is reasonable to expect), the holders of contingent capital receive the notional amount 
of the converted instrument in shares. In the example illustrated above, let’s assume that, at 
the time of conversion, the stock price is 25 euros, so that the bondholders receive 40 shares 
(1,000 / 25). If they manage to sell the shares immediately at 25 euros, they do not suffer 
any loss and they can buy new convertible debt, to keep their investment profile unchanged. 
If they do not, they start taking equity risk only from the exact moment the debt is 
converted. 
On the other hand, existing shareholders are strongly penalized due to significant 
dilution of their ownership. The lower the market value of shares, the higher the dilution. In 
that respect, this conversion mechanism entails consequences that are very close to what 
would happen in liquidation: existing shareholders bear losses before subordinated debt 
holders. From the governance perspective, shareholders are penalised for not having 
properly controlled managers; debt holders start to take an equity risk only after conversion.  
A potential disadvantage of this mechanism is that it could lead to the issuance of a near 
infinite number of shares (for instance due to death spirals). Imagine the above bank issuing 
the bond in good times with a 50 euros ordinary share price, at the very moment when 
triggers are hit, the share price is five cents. Running a market price conversion in this case 
would result in the converting instrument holders potentially owning the bank; it would 
also materially complicate any private sector capital injection, due to the ‘wallpapering’ 
effect of issuing a near infinite number of ordinary shares to the converting holders. One 
possible solution is to set a floor on the share price used in the conversion. For example, a 
floor can be set at 25 per cent of the bank's share price at the time of contingent capital 
                                                 
20 This is the approach adopted for CRD2 convertible Tier1 hybrids, according to CEBS guidelines.    27
issuance (25 per cent * 50 = 12.5); this is equivalent to setting a cap on the number of 
shares: upon conversion, the maximum number of shares that investors can receive is 80 
(1,000 euros / 12.5). This would also mitigate the dilution.  
Another shortcoming of this conversion mechanism is that it may determine death 
spirals when, after conversion, CCC subscribers start selling their shares. A ’lock-up‘ 
clause, prohibiting them from selling converted shares for a predefined period of time, may 
overcome this problem, but would increase the risk of contagion from banks to CCC 
investors
21. 
In option 3 debt holders receive a number of shares, which is not linked to their fair 
value. For instance, if the nominal value of each share is 10 euros and does not change over 
time, at conversion investors receive 100 shares, implying a potential gain or loss 
depending on the market price of the shares after conversion. This conversion methodology 
might perhaps be useful for non-joint stock companies, given that retained earning are 
generally not available to shareholders. 
The capital increase can also be achieved, as in the Rabobank case, through a permanent 
(total/partial) write-down of the original instrument which is (partially) extinguished. This 
option is somehow peripheral and has the advantage that no new shares are issued. In this 
case, the total write-down of the nominal value of a convertible debt generates a 
correspondent gain and a consequential increase in retained earnings. In our example, after 
issuing the par value 1,000 euros bond, the bank has a liability in its balance sheet for 1,000 
euros. When the trigger is pulled, debt is written down, the liability is (permanently) 
extinguished and there is an increase in reserves (+ 1,000 euros). 
This mechanism does not meet the hierarchy in the allocation of losses that occurs in 
liquidation: in fact, it may well happen that a debt holder is fully written down before 
shareholders bear losses and are wiped out. Moreover, the contingent capital with write- 
down does not give investors any upside but a brutal 100 per cent loss. As for shareholders, 
for them this is the first best option, because with a permanent write-down dilution is 
completely avoided. 
For these reasons, the marketability of these instruments is uncertain: much probably 
depends on how the structure of triggers is defined; if this is calibrated in order to represent 
a low-probability, high-severity event, it might possibly work. A possible way to mitigate 
this issue is to reduce the write-down (as in the Rabobank structure), for example assuming 
a permanent partial write-down (75 per cent). One potential advantage of this option is that 
it is easier for fixed-income investors to keep these instruments in their portfolios.  
In light of the above, we think that the most convincing mechanism is the one based on a 
capped variable number of shares, which penalizes the shareholdings more, but avoids 
                                                 
21 An alternative is the Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertible (COERC) proposed by Pennacchi et al. 
(2010). For COERC, conversion price is set significantly below the trigger price and equity holders have the 
option to buy back the shares from the bondholders at the conversion price.   28
wallpapering. Option 2 with a cap on the maximum number of shares to be issued upon 
conversion is therefore our preferred option. The risk of dilution poses correct incentives 
for existing shareholders to monitor managers, in order to prevent the trigger from being 
pulled. At the same time, since the cap entails that debt holders may also suffer some 
losses, there is an increase in market discipline. However, it is an open issue whether 
conversion mechanisms should be determined by prudential regulation or rather left to 
bargaining between issuers and subscribers.  
All in all, option 2 with a cap is probably the most consistent with the structure of 
powers and responsibilities assigned to the different stakeholders. It also reduces equity risk 
for fixed-income investors, thus minimizing possible contagion across different categories 
of investors when the trigger is activated. We acknowledge that, if the firm-specific trigger 
is defined in terms of market variables (the stock price of the bank), there may be room for 
manipulation. However, the double trigger should lessen the possibilities of gaming.  
Whatever conversion rate is chosen, the bank has to maintain at all times prior 
authorization (e.g., shareholders’ approval) to immediately issue the relevant number of 
shares specified in the instrument’s terms and conditions, should conversion be triggered.  
 
9.  Prudential treatment 
As for the prudential treatment, it is very important to keep firmly in mind the objective 
of the instrument, i.e., to contribute to the build up of countercyclical capital buffers to be 
used in bad times.  
In fact, the revision of the Basel framework is clearly moving towards a new set of 
capital standards, including time-invariant minima and countercyclical buffers (BCBS 
2009, 2010). As we mentioned, the two categories of requirements should be kept distinct 
from one another.  
In that respect, the issuance of contingent capital instruments in good times, (not 
included in supervisory capital before conversion) allows banks to accumulate a capital 
buffer in good times, i.e. when it is possible, easier and less costly; when the triggers are 
pulled, this instrument is extinguished and through conversion (or write-downs) new capital 
flows into the bank at precisely the moment it is needed.
22  
We therefore believe that banks should be allowed – not obliged – to use CCC for 
meeting the buffer requirement before conversion, even though it would not be eligible for 
meeting minimum capital requirements. In order to avoid double counting, a bank’s holding 
in CCC of another bank should be deducted from its own CCC. 
As regards the features required for these instruments: they have to be paid fully at 
issuance (i.e., no unfunded instruments allowed) to avoid counterparty credit risk and 
                                                 
22 With respect to the conversion of Tier1 hybrids, this is ‘truly’ new regulatory capital flowing in.   29
prevent contagion effects when the trigger is pulled; they should be either perpetual or at 
least long dated and permanent in order to avoid the risk of rollover. Flexibility of 
payments does not seem to be relevant to the extent that such instruments are used to meet 
the buffer requirement.
23  
After conversion (or write-down) of the instrument, the contingent capital would 
disappear, with the bank having more common equity to rely on. Where provided for by the 
regulation, the fit and proper test for shareholders would be carried out at conversion. 
Failure to comply with the test may result, for instance, in the suspension of voting rights. 
In short, CCC might effectively cover countercyclical capital buffers, in particular what 
the Basel Committee calls the buffer for dealing with excessive credit growth. Since these 
buffers are to be accumulated in good times and released in bad times (i.e., in bad times 
banks are not required to hold the buffer), CCC seems a reasonable option for banks and 
might be acceptable for supervisors. In practice, in good times the buffer would be 
accumulated through the issuance of contingent capital; when the cycle reverses, banks 
would no longer be requested to accumulate buffers and convert contingent capital in order 
to: i) cover losses; ii) absorb the increase of minimum capital requirements; iii) continue 
granting credit. In this case, the triggers for converting contingent capital can be calibrated 
in order to serve also as triggers for the release of the countercyclical buffer. With respect 




In this paper, we discuss the possibility of introducing contingent capital for covering 
capital needs arising from the implementation of countercyclical buffers. We propose a 
double trigger in the conversion, which would be required when simultaneously: a) the 
financial system is facing systemic distress; and b) the individual bank – while still in a 
going concern status – shows weaknesses.  
We test double triggers based on both accounting and market variables for the micro-
component. The main result of our analysis is that there may be room for countercyclical 
contingent capital, although the calibration of the triggers is a challenging task.
24 The 
choice of the most appropriate threshold (i.e., of the severity of triggering events) – which 
is very much affected by data availability – depends on the characteristics and role of the 
buffer that contingent capital is supposed to cover. Our assessment also suggests that 
                                                 
23 In essence flexibility of payments (ability to cancel/defer coupon payments) provides a (limited) loss 
absorption, as it enables banks to prevent cash outflows in times of stress. 
24 The difficulties in identifying coincident indicators of bank distress are acknowledged by the BCBS (2010). 
In its proposal for a countercyclical buffer, the Committee did not select a specific variable, but rather left to 
authorities’ discretion the identification of ‘bad times’, when banks are allowed to release the buffers 
accumulated during booms.    30
country-specific thresholds may be preferable. Another outcome is that the prudential 
ratios, while less prone to manipulation, are available at low frequencies, a serious 
drawback if prompt conversion is needed. They are also affected by heterogeneous 
eligibility criteria for capital instruments across jurisdictions. However, under the proposed 
new definition of regulatory capital, the identification of common thresholds may be more 
workable for prudential triggers too. 
In terms of the conversion mechanism, we support the approach based on a variable 
number of shares, which penalizes  shareholdings more, with a cap that avoids 
wallpapering. Depending on the severity of the scenario that triggers the conversion, this 
may significantly limit the risk for contingent capital subscribers, thus reducing possible 
contagion from issuers to holders. The risk of cross-sectional procyclicality should also be 
reduced given that such instruments are fully paid at issuance.  
As for prudential treatment, we believe banks should be allowed to use contingent 
capital for meeting the buffer requirement before conversion; however, contingent capital 
would not be eligible as regulatory capital and it would not accordingly be available for 
meeting minimum capital requirements. After conversion, the contingent capital would fade 
out, leaving the bank with an increased quantity of common equity to rely on.  
In taking the decision on the possible use of contingent capital for prudential purposes, 
regulators will trade-off the potential benefits of this tool and the risk that a complex design 
leaves room for excessive financial innovation and arbitrage opportunities. To what extent 
CCC design is consistent with the willingness of the supervisory community to keep capital 
instruments as simple as possible remains an open issue.    31
 
References 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Strengthening the resilience of the banking 
sector, Consultative document, December 2009. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Countercyclical capital buffer proposal, 
Consultative document, July 2010. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Proposal to ensure the loss absorbency of 
regulatory capital at the point of non-viability, Consultative document, August 2010. 
Borio C. and Drehmann M., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Assessing the 
risk of banking crises – revisited’, BIS Quarterly Review, March 2009. 
Cannata F. and Quagliariello M., ‘The Value of Market Information in Banking 
Supervision: Evidence from Italy’, Journal of Financial Services Research, vol. 27(2), pp 
139-162, 2005. 
Claessens, S, Herring R.J. and Schoenmaker D., ‘A Safer World Financial System: 
Improving the Resolution of Systemic Institutions’, 12th Geneva Report on the World 
Economy, International Centre for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva, and CEPR, 
2010.  
Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Consultation Paper, Implementation 
Guidelines regarding Instruments referred to in Article 57(a) of Directive 2006/48/EC 
recast, CP 33, December 2009. 
EU Commission, Public consultation regarding further possible changes to the Capital 
Requirement Directive ("CRD"), February 2010. 
Flannery M., ‘No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via Reverse Convertible 
Debentures’, in H. S. Scott (ed.), Capital Adequacy beyond Basel; Banking, Securities, and 
Insurance, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Flannery M., ‘Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital 
Certificates’, Carefin Working Paper, no. 4., 2010. 
Goodhart C. A. E., ‘Are CoCos from Cloud Cuckoo-Land?’, VoxEU 2010. 
Hancock, D. and Passmore, W., ‘Mandatory Convertible Subordinated Debt and 
Systemic Risks’, slides presented at Methods of Implementing Systemic Risk Regulation, 
Symposium, New York Federal Reserve Bank, 2009. 
Institute for International Finance, ‘Straw Man Industry Contingent Capital 
Considerations’, Working Group on Definition of Capital, 2010. 
Kaminsky G. L. and Reinhart C. M., ‘The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and 
Balance-of-Payments Problems’, American Economic Review, no. 89, vol. 3, 1999.   32
Laeven L. and Valencia F., ‘Resolution of Banking Crises: the Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly’, IMF Working Paper, no. 146, 2010. 
Libertucci M. and Quagliariello M., ‘Rules vs. discretion in macroprudential policies’, 
VoxEu 2010. 
Mc Donald R. L., ‘Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger’, Northwestern 
University, mimeo 2010. 
Pennacchi G., Vermaelen T. and Wolff C. C. P., ‘Contingent Capital: The Case for 
COERCs’, mimeo 2010. 
Reinhart C. M. and Rogoff K. S., This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly, Princeton University Press, 2009. 
Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, (2009), An Expedited Resolution 
Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities, 2009.  
Standard&Poor’s, ‘Contingent Capital Is Not A Panacea For Banks’, Research 2009. 
Sundaresan S. and Wang, Z., ‘Design of Contingent Capital with a Stock Price Trigger 
for Mandatory Conversion’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 448, 
2010. 
Turner A. and others, The Future of Finance: The LSE Report, London School of 




   33
Table 5 – Panel A 
Micro trigger value: -4.9 -3.7 -2.5 -10 -7.5 -5 -20 -15 -10 -1.5 -1 0 1.25 1 0.75 1.5 1.2 0.9
-6 11.9 14.2 17.9 14.2 14.9 18.7 14.2 16.4 20.9 8.6 11.2 35.5 8.6 19.1 24.3 29.6 36.2 47.0
-4 24.6 27.6 34.3 21.6 24.6 31.3 17.2 21.6 26.9 12.5 17.8 53.3 15.1 30.9 36.2 45.4 57.9 80.6
-2 41.8 50.7 59.0 24.6 30.6 48.5 19.4 28.4 35.1 17.1 20.4 79.6 19.7 41.4 55.9 64.5 81.6 99.9
-10 7.2 8.0 10.1 5.1 7.2 8.7 5.8 7.2 10.1 8.1 10.6 25.5 4.3 11.8 19.3 23.0 26.1 37.0
-7.5 13.0 14.5 18.1 9.4 10.9 14.5 9.4 13.8 17.4 12.4 15.5 37.9 6.2 16.1 29.8 34.8 41.0 54.3
-5 24.6 29.0 36.2 14.5 15.9 26.1 13.0 18.8 22.5 14.9 18.6 57.8 14.3 28.0 44.1 49.7 60.9 82.6
-20 3.8 3.8 4.5 1.9 4.5 4.5 1.3 1.3 1.9 5.0 5.6 8.1 1.9 3.7 8.7 11.8 12.4 14.1
-15 7.7 9.0 10.9 5.1 8.3 10.9 3.8 4.5 5.1 7.5 8.7 19.3 3.7 8.7 17.4 20.5 23.6 32.1
-10 13.5 16.7 23.1 9.6 14.1 19.2 6.4 7.7 10.3 11.2 14.3 36.6 9.3 21.7 31.1 34.8 42.9 62.2
2 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
3 2.2 2.7 3.1 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.8 2.5 0.8 1.7 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.1
4 4.4 4.9 5.3 1.3 1.8 2.2 0.9 1.3 1.8 0.8 0.8 4.6 1.3 2.9 1.7 2.1 4.2 5.3
-22.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.4 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.4 1.3 1.3
-12.5 2.2 2.2 2.7 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.1 0.8 1.7 1.3 1.7 2.5 2.7
-7 2.2 2.2 2.7 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.1 0.8 1.7 1.3 1.7 2.5 2.7
4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
5 4.0 5.0 5.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 2.0 3.5 3.5 0.5 0.5 3.7 0.9 3.7 3.7 4.7 5.0
6 16.0 19.0 20.0 13.5 15.5 16.0 7.5 10.5 12.0 1.9 1.9 15.0 2.8 6.1 14.5 15.4 17.8 20.0
8 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.3 0.5 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.8 3.0
9 20.5 24.0 25.5 16.5 17.5 19.5 7.5 11.0 14.5 1.4 1.4 17.8 5.1 11.7 16.8 18.2 21.5 25.5
10 43.0 51.5 56.0 26.5 32.5 38.0 15.0 20.0 27.5 5.6 5.6 42.1 14.5 25.2 34.1 38.3 45.8 56.0
Unconditional probab. 81.3 93.8 100.0 43.8 56.3 68.8 31.3 37.5 50.0 18.8 18.8 81.3 31.3 50.0 62.5 68.8 87.5
abnormal return 2 weeks
abnormal return 3 months
equity/total assets   
bank index return 2 weeks 
return on equity  
tier 1 ratio   
total capital ratio   
abnormal return 1 month
Historical joint probability of different triggers combinations
Country = Italy; Frequency = monthly (with no duplications)
Macro trigger
gdp deviation from hp trend normalised real interbank rate normalised 10Y-3M sov. spread bank index return 3 months  Unconditional 
probability
bank index return 1 month   34
Table 5 – Panel B 
Micro trigger value: -4.9 -3.7 -2.5 -10 -7.5 -5 -20 -15 -10 -1.5 -1 0 1.25 1 0.75 1.5 1.2 0.9
-6 9.4 14.2 17.0 9.4 13.2 18.9 12.3 14.2 18.9 13.2 18.9 35.8 8.5 14.2 41.5 4.7 8.5 25.5 50.0
-4 18.9 23.6 26.4 14.2 22.6 33.0 16.0 20.8 26.4 15.1 22.6 54.7 14.2 29.2 60.4 9.4 16.0 43.4 79.2
-2 26.4 34.9 40.6 22.6 32.1 44.3 22.6 29.2 37.7 16.0 24.5 66.0 22.6 37.7 76.4 16.0 32.1 63.2 98.1
-10 10.3 12.0 16.2 6.8 10.3 12.8 11.1 17.9 20.5 10.7 17.4 31.4 6.6 13.2 31.4 5.0 8.3 21.5 44.4
-7.5 12.0 17.1 23.9 9.4 12.8 17.1 14.5 21.4 23.1 10.7 17.4 38.8 10.7 20.7 45.5 5.8 14.9 30.6 60.7
-5 20.5 27.4 40.2 14.5 23.1 29.1 19.7 24.8 29.1 14.0 22.3 50.4 15.7 31.4 62.8 7.4 18.2 43.0 82.9
-20 9.5 10.3 12.1 6.0 8.6 9.5 6.0 7.8 7.8 8.3 10.0 17.5 3.3 6.7 15.0 3.3 5.8 19.2 25.9
-15 12.9 13.8 19.0 7.8 11.2 13.8 8.6 10.3 12.9 9.2 12.5 24.2 6.7 13.3 29.2 3.3 8.3 26.7 40.5
-10 19.0 22.4 28.4 11.2 18.1 20.7 13.8 15.5 19.0 11.7 15.8 38.3 10.8 20.0 44.2 6.7 13.3 35.0 59.5
2 9.3 11.9 11.9 7.1 8.0 11.9 5.3 6.2 9.3 5.0 5.4 10.4 5.0 7.1 12.1 3.8 6.3 9.6 14.2
3 35.0 45.6 45.6 24.3 28.3 45.6 18.6 22.6 35.0 10.0 13.3 37.1 12.9 22.1 46.7 12.5 22.9 37.9 54.0
4 56.2 73.0 73.0 40.3 46.0 73.0 28.3 34.1 55.8 14.6 20.0 57.5 20.8 36.3 74.6 18.3 34.2 61.3 85.8
-22.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.5 3.8 2.5 2.5 3.3 1.3 1.3 2.5 3.5
-12.5 6.2 6.6 6.6 4.9 6.2 6.6 5.8 5.8 6.6 5.4 6.3 7.9 3.3 3.3 6.3 2.1 3.8 5.8 7.5
-7 8.0 8.8 8.8 6.2 8.0 8.8 7.5 7.5 8.8 7.1 7.9 10.0 4.6 4.6 7.9 2.1 4.6 6.7 9.7
4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3
5 6.3 7.5 7.5 5.0 5.0 7.5 2.5 2.5 4.4 1.2 1.2 5.8 1.8 4.7 8.8 4.1 5.8 6.4 10.1
6 26.4 32.1 32.1 22.0 22.6 32.1 10.7 11.3 20.8 1.8 3.5 23.4 6.4 15.2 34.5 12.3 18.1 28.1 37.7
8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.1 1.1 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.9 0.6 0.6 1.7 3.1
9 9.9 11.1 11.1 8.6 8.6 11.1 4.9 4.9 7.4 1.1 1.7 9.2 3.4 7.5 12.6 4.0 6.3 9.2 14.2
10 28.4 32.7 32.7 22.8 24.1 32.7 13.0 14.2 24.1 4.0 6.3 24.7 8.6 16.7 35.1 10.9 16.1 27.0 38.3
Unconditional probab. 67.9 86.7 86.7 49.2 55.4 86.7 37.1 43.3 68.3 18.8 25.0 67.9 25.0 43.3 86.7 25.0 43.3 74.6
abnormal return 2 weeks
abnormal return 3 months
equity/total assets   
Unconditional 
probability
bank index return 3 months  bank index return 1 month  bank index return 2 weeks 
return on equity  
tier 1 ratio   
total capital ratio   
abnormal return 1 month
Historical joint probability of different triggers combinations
Country = Germany; Frequency = monthly (with no duplications)
gdp deviation from hp trend normalised real interbank rate normalised 10Y-3M sov. spread
Macro trigger  35
Table 5 – Panel C  
Micro trigger value: -4.9 -3.7 -2.5 -10 -7.5 -5 -20 -15 -10 -1.5 -1 0 1.25 1 0.75 1.5 1.2 0.9
-6 1.2 4.8 6.0 6.0 8.4 10.8 4.8 12.0 14.5 9.6 9.6 16.9 1.2 4.8 12.0 9.6 13.3 22.9 32.5
-4 6.0 12.0 16.9 13.3 16.9 20.5 9.6 18.1 21.7 12.0 12.0 25.3 1.2 8.4 21.7 15.7 25.3 39.8 60.2
-2 16.9 26.5 37.3 21.7 31.3 41.0 14.5 26.5 33.7 14.5 14.5 38.6 3.6 15.7 43.4 25.3 42.2 60.2 95.2
-10 2.3 3.4 1.1 1.1 3.4 5.7 5.7 7.4 8.5 14.9 2.1 5.3 7.4 6.4 8.5 13.8 23.0
-7.5 2.3 5.7 12.6 3.4 5.7 5.7 9.2 11.5 12.6 9.6 9.6 21.3 2.1 6.4 16.0 6.4 9.6 24.5 40.2
-5 5.7 11.5 16.1 5.7 10.3 13.8 12.6 16.1 18.4 11.7 11.7 25.5 2.1 10.6 28.7 13.8 21.3 33.0 63.2
-20 1.1 3.4 4.6 3.4 3.4 2.3 4.6 7.4 7.4 10.6 2.1 3.2 4.3 5.3 5.3 10.6 14.9
-15 2.3 5.7 8.0 1.1 4.6 4.6 2.3 4.6 7.4 7.4 14.9 2.1 5.3 7.4 8.5 11.7 16.0 25.3
-10 6.9 12.6 17.2 9.2 14.9 14.9 5.7 8.0 11.5 8.5 9.6 24.5 2.1 8.5 17.0 10.6 19.1 28.7 50.6
2 0.0
3 0.0
4 2.6 3.9 5.7 1.7 3.1 3.9 1.3 1.3 2.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 3.8 4.6 1.3 2.5 3.3 5.7
-22.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
-12.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
-7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
4 1.0 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.5
5 1.5 2.4 2.9 1.0 1.5 2.4 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.5 1.4 0.5 0.9 1.9 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.9
6 2.0 5.4 5.9 2.0 2.9 5.4 1.0 1.5 2.0 0.5 0.5 1.4 0.5 1.9 4.6 0.9 1.4 2.8 5.9
8 2.0 2.9 3.4 1.5 2.4 2.9 1.0 1.5 2.0 0.5 0.5 1.4 0.5 1.4 2.3 0.9 1.4 2.3 3.4
9 2.0 3.9 5.4 2.0 2.9 3.9 1.0 2.0 2.4 0.5 0.5 1.9 0.5 2.3 4.2 0.9 2.8 3.7 5.4
10 8.8 13.7 16.6 5.9 10.7 15.1 3.9 6.8 9.3 1.9 1.9 6.5 1.4 7.4 15.7 6.5 11.6 14.4 19.5
Unconditional probab. 43.8 68.8 87.5 37.5 56.3 75.0 25.0 37.5 43.8 10.8 10.8 35.8 6.3 25.0 67.1 35.8 54.6 73.3
Unconditional 
probability
equity/total assets   
return on equity  
tier 1 ratio   
total capital ratio   
bank index return 3 months 
abnormal return 1 month
abnormal return 2 weeks
abnormal return 3 months
Historical joint probability of different triggers combinations
Country = Spain; Frequency = monthly (wih no duplications)
Macro trigger
gdp deviation from hp trend normalised real interbank rate normalised 10Y-3M sov. spread bank index return 1 month  bank index return 2 weeks   36
Table 5 – Panel D  
Micro trigger value: -4.9 -3.7 -2.5 -10 -7.5 -5 -20 -15 -10 -1.5 -1 0 1.25 1 0.75 1.5 1.2 0.9
-6 5.5 6.8 8.2 5.5 5.5 12.3 8.2 9.6 15.1 5.5 11.0 15.1 8.2 12.3 23.3 11.0 15.1 21.9 39.7
-4 11.0 15.1 17.8 9.6 9.6 19.2 11.0 12.3 19.2 6.8 15.1 23.3 11.0 17.8 35.6 15.1 24.7 37.0 58.9
-2 23.3 30.1 38.4 15.1 19.2 37.0 13.7 15.1 28.8 11.0 26.0 39.7 13.7 30.1 64.4 30.1 47.9 64.4 91.8
-10 8.0 9.3 9.3 8.0 9.3 12.0 8.0 8.0 10.7 4.7 9.4 11.8 4.7 8.2 17.6 8.2 11.8 17.6 33.3
-7.5 10.7 12.0 14.7 8.0 9.3 12.0 9.3 9.3 13.3 8.2 16.5 18.8 5.9 10.6 23.5 10.6 18.8 27.1 48.0
-5 13.3 17.3 20.0 10.7 13.3 17.3 10.7 13.3 20.0 11.8 21.2 28.2 7.1 15.3 36.5 15.3 25.9 42.4 70.7
-20 5.3 6.7 6.7 1.3 2.7 5.3 1.3 1.3 2.7 2.4 5.9 7.1 3.5 4.7 10.6 5.9 9.4 14.1 24.0
-15 12.0 13.3 14.7 4.0 6.7 8.0 1.3 2.7 5.3 3.5 9.4 10.6 3.5 7.1 15.3 8.2 11.8 18.8 30.7
-10 17.3 21.3 25.3 8.0 12.0 16.0 2.7 5.3 9.3 5.9 14.1 18.8 3.5 9.4 22.4 12.9 20.0 30.6 48.0
2 5.7 6.2 7.5 3.5 4.4 5.7 2.6 3.1 4.8 1.7 1.7 3.8 2.9 3.3 5.8 2.9 2.9 6.3 7.9
3 29.5 31.7 36.6 17.6 22.5 27.8 8.4 15.0 23.8 6.3 12.1 18.3 10.8 17.5 28.8 17.9 19.6 32.1 37.0
4 59.5 64.8 74.4 37.0 45.8 55.1 16.3 29.5 48.5 10.8 23.8 37.9 18.8 31.7 56.3 37.5 42.1 66.7 75.3
-22.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.9 1.3 0.4 0.9 1.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.3
-12.5 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.8 2.7 3.1 1.8 2.7 3.1 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.9 1.3 1.3 2.9 3.1
-7 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.7 3.6 4.0 2.7 3.6 4.0 2.1 2.5 2.9 2.5 2.9 3.8 1.3 1.3 3.8 4.0
4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.8 2.4 0.6 1.2 1.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 2.2 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.4
5 6.0 6.0 6.0 3.0 4.8 6.0 0.6 2.4 3.6 0.6 1.7 1.1 1.7 5.6 5.0 5.0 5.6 6.0
6 18.7 18.7 18.7 9.0 15.7 18.7 2.4 9.6 12.7 3.9 6.1 3.4 7.3 17.3 15.1 15.1 17.3 18.7
8 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.8 2.4 0.6 1.2 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.2 1.6 1.6 2.2 2.4
9 11.2 11.2 12.4 4.1 7.1 11.2 1.8 5.9 8.9 0.5 2.2 4.4 4.4 6.0 11.0 8.2 8.8 10.4 12.4
10 32.5 33.1 36.1 17.2 24.9 32.5 7.7 17.8 25.4 3.8 11.5 15.9 11.5 18.7 31.9 20.3 22.5 30.8 36.1
Unconditional probab. 81.3 86.7 99.2 50.0 62.5 75.0 25.0 43.8 68.8 14.6 33.3 51.3 25.0 43.8 75.0 52.1 58.3 88.8
return on equity  
tier 1 ratio   
total capital ratio   
Unconditional 
probability
bank index return 1 month  bank index return 3 months  bank index return 2 weeks 
abnormal return 1 month
abnormal return 2 weeks
abnormal return 3 months
equity/total assets   
Macro trigger
Historical joint probability of different triggers combinations
Country = France; Frequency = monthly (with no duplications)
gdp deviation from hp trend normalised real interbank rate normalised 10Y-3M sov. spread  37
Table 5 – Panel E  
Micro trigger value: -4.9 -3.7 -2.5 -10 -7.5 -5 -20 -15 -10 -1.5 -1 0 1.25 1 0.75 1.5 1.2 0.9
-6 8.4 10.3 16.8 13.1 18.7 21.5 8.4 16.8 20.6 7.5 7.5 15.9 0.9 25.2 37.4 8.4 12.1 19.6 49.5
-4 15.0 20.6 31.8 20.6 26.2 31.8 14.0 26.2 31.8 9.3 9.3 26.2 3.7 43.0 60.7 15.0 19.6 27.1 76.6
-2 26.2 33.6 56.1 29.9 36.4 42.1 17.8 33.6 43.0 10.3 10.3 51.4 7.5 55.1 80.4 28.0 32.7 43.0 99.9
-10 6.3 8.0 13.4 9.8 10.7 10.7 8.0 12.5 14.3 8.0 8.0 12.5 0.9 17.0 23.2 9.8 10.7 13.4 32.1
-7.5 9.8 11.6 17.0 14.3 16.1 17.0 10.7 17.9 21.4 8.9 8.9 21.4 1.8 26.8 40.2 10.7 15.2 20.5 51.8
-5 12.5 16.1 28.6 19.6 22.3 27.7 11.6 23.2 28.6 8.9 8.9 31.3 4.5 41.1 62.5 18.8 24.1 33.9 81.3
-20 6.3 7.1 9.8 8.9 10.7 10.7 4.5 7.1 8.0 5.4 5.4 6.3 0.9 12.5 14.3 4.5 5.4 5.4 17.9
-15 9.8 11.6 15.2 11.6 13.4 15.2 6.3 9.8 10.7 8.0 8.0 11.6 2.7 17.9 23.2 8.0 9.8 12.5 29.5
-10 19.6 21.4 27.7 17.9 21.4 25.9 8.9 15.2 18.8 8.9 8.9 22.3 5.4 27.7 38.4 11.6 13.4 18.8 52.7
2 6.4 7.6 10.6 5.1 6.8 7.2 3.8 4.7 6.4 3.3 3.3 10.4 1.3 6.7 12.9 4.2 5.4 5.4 13.6
3 11.9 14.4 19.9 9.3 12.7 14.0 6.8 8.1 11.9 5.0 5.0 16.7 2.1 11.7 21.3 7.5 10.0 10.4 23.7
4 25.0 28.8 40.3 20.8 28.4 32.2 11.9 17.4 26.3 7.5 7.5 29.6 6.3 25.0 37.9 15.4 19.2 21.3 45.3
-22.5 3.4 3.8 4.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.8 5.0 2.9 3.8 4.6 5.0 5.0 4.3
-12.5 3.8 4.3 4.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.5 2.9 3.8 5.0 5.5 5.5 4.7
-7 5.1 5.6 6.0 4.7 5.1 5.1 3.8 4.7 5.1 3.8 3.8 6.3 3.4 4.2 5.9 6.3 6.3 6.0
4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
6 1.2 1.2 2.5 1.2 1.2 2.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 2.5
8 0.0
9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
10 1.2 1.2 3.6 2.4 2.4 3.6 1.2 1.8 2.4 0.6 0.6 2.3 0.6 2.9 2.9 1.8 1.8 2.3 3.6
Unconditional probab. 55.8 62.1 93.3 55.8 68.3 80.8 30.8 43.3 62.1 12.5 12.5 56.3 18.8 62.5 81.3 37.5 43.8 50.0
Historical joint probability of different triggers combinations
Country = UK; Frequency = monthly (with no duplications)
bank index return 2 weeks  bank index return 1 month  bank index return 3 months 
Macro trigger
return on equity  
tier 1 ratio   
total capital ratio   
abnormal return 1 month
abnormal return 2 weeks
abnormal return 3 months
equity/total assets   
gdp deviation from hp trend normalised real interbank rate normalised 10Y-3M sov. spread Unconditional 
probability  38
Table 5 – Panel F  
Micro trigger value: -4.9 -3.7 -2.5 -10 -7.5 -5 -20 -15 -10 -1.5 -1 0 1.25 1 0.75 1.5 1.2 0.9
-6 9.9 11.6 18.8 8.8 9.9 16.0 8.3 12.2 18.2 13.8 20.4 23.2 3.9 21.0 27.1 18.8 21.0 23.2 47.0
-4 18.8 23.2 34.3 13.8 16.6 28.2 11.0 17.1 28.7 18.8 23.8 28.7 7.2 37.0 45.9 26.5 27.1 33.7 70.7
-2 32.0 40.3 52.5 19.3 2 4 . 94 2 . 01 2 . 2 18.2 39.2 21.0 28.2 40.9 15.5 56.4 68.0 33.1 34.3 54.1 97.2
-10 9.4 10.5 13.1 7.3 7.9 11.5 8.4 9.9 16.2 9.2 12.8 16.9 2.1 11.8 20.0 11.8 12.8 13.3 33.0
-7.5 16.2 17.3 23.0 12.0 13.6 19.9 9.9 14.1 22.5 13.3 17.4 23.6 4.1 26.2 34.4 17.9 19.0 23.1 51.8
-5 22.0 26.2 36.6 13.6 16.2 26.7 9.9 15.7 28.8 16.9 21.5 29.7 8.2 43.1 52.3 25.1 26.7 36.4 75.9
-20 5.8 6.3 10.5 5.2 5.8 7.3 5.2 6.3 7.9 6.2 7.7 8.7 1.0 6.7 10.3 6.7 7.2 7.2 17.3
-15 8.9 10.5 15.7 6.8 8.4 12.6 6.8 8.9 12.0 7.7 9.7 12.8 2.1 12.3 17.4 9.7 10.3 10.8 26.7
-10 17.8 22.0 29.3 9.9 15.2 24.1 7.9 10.5 18.3 12.8 16.9 21.5 5.6 26.2 34.4 18.5 19.0 24.1 52.4
2 0.0
3 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9
4 1.8 2.6 2.6 0.9 2.2 2.6 0.9 1.8 1.8 0.4 0.4 1.7 1.7 3.3 3.3 0.8 0.8 2.1 4.0
-22.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
-12.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.7 2.1 0.4 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.3
-7 2.3 2.3 2 . 31 . 82 . 32 . 31 . 82 . 32 . 3 1.7 1.7 2.1 0.4 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.3
4 0.0
5 0.0
6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
8 0.0
9 0.0
10 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
Unconditional probab. 56.3 81.3 81.3 31.3 5 0 . 06 8 . 81 8 . 83 7 . 55 6 . 3 21.3 27.5 46.3 31.3 68.8 75.0 33.8 33.8 65.0
bank index return 3 months 
abnormal return 1 month
abnormal return 2 weeks
total capital ratio
abnormal return 3 months
equity/total assets   
return on equity  
tier 1 ratio   
Historical joint probability of different triggers combinations
Country = US; Frequency = monthly (with no duplications)
Macro trigger
gdp deviation from hp trend normalised real interbank rate normalised 10Y-3M sov. spread bank index return 1 month  Unconditional 
probability
bank index return 2 weeks   39
Table 5 – Panel G  
Micro trigger value: -4.9 -3.7 -2.5 -10 -7.5 -5 -20 -15 -10 -1.5 -1 0 1.25 1 0.75 1.5 1.2 0.9
-6 19.5 24.2 27.5 13.4 18.8 32.2 18.1 20.8 32.2 17.0 25.5 40.5 13.7 22.2 28.8 2.0 11.8 28.7
-4 33.6 38.9 41.6 24.2 29.5 48.3 24.8 28.9 42.3 19.0 28.8 49.7 19.0 32.7 43.8 5.9 30.1 60.0
-2 45.0 53.7 58.4 34.9 49.0 69.1 32.2 38.9 58.4 23.5 32.7 64.1 22.9 44.4 62.1 9.8 39.2 99.1
-10 19.5 23.5 27.5 12.8 16.1 26.2 14.1 18.1 31.5 13.1 19.6 33.3 13.1 17.6 21.6 0.7 8.5 16.0
-7.5 25.5 30.9 35.6 16.8 22.1 34.9 17.4 22.8 36.2 17.6 24.2 41.8 17.6 24.8 30.1 2.0 17.0 31.9
-5 32.9 40.3 45.6 25.5 32.9 49.0 20.8 26.8 47.0 22.2 28.1 52.9 23.5 37.9 48.4 5.2 32.7 63.0
-20 9.4 10.7 12.8 2.7 5.4 12.1 4.0 4.7 11.4 5.2 7.2 13.7 4.6 5.2 10.5 5.2 4.8
-15 15.4 20.1 25.5 8.7 12.1 24.2 10.1 12.1 21.5 9.8 13.1 24.2 9.8 13.7 19.6 9.8 14.5
-10 23.5 30.9 38.3 16.8 22.1 34.2 16.8 20.8 33.6 17.0 24.2 37.3 19.6 28.8 39.9 2.6 22.9 39.5
2 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.8 2.2 0.9 0.9 1.8 0.4 0.9 1.8 0.4 0.4 1.3
3 7.2 7.6 7.6 5.8 7.2 7.6 4.9 5.4 7.6 2.2 2.2 7.2 1.8 4.5 7.2 1.8 2.7 3.1
4 36.3 43.0 43.0 30.0 39.5 50.2 21.1 24.7 42.2 10.3 14.3 37.2 10.3 29.6 43.5 19.3 33.6 5.3
-22.5 8.1 8.5 8.5 8.1 8.1 8.5 7.6 8.1 8.5 4.5 5.8 8.1 1.3 4.5 8.1 0.4 0.4 1.3
-12.5 18.4 18.8 18.8 14.8 17.9 19.3 14.3 15.2 18.8 8.5 11.2 18.4 2.7 12.1 18.8 3.6 4.5 2.7
-7 24.2 25.1 25.1 19.3 24.2 25.6 18.4 19.3 25.1 9.4 12.6 24.2 5.8 17.0 24.7 5.8 9.0 2.7
4 3 . 03 . 63 . 63 . 03 . 03 . 62 . 53 . 03 . 6 1 . 0 1 . 03 . 0 1 . 03 . 0 0 . 50 . 5 0 . 5
5 14.2 19.8 19.8 13.2 18.8 23.4 7.6 8.6 19.8 4.6 5.1 17.8 3.6 13.7 17.8 14.7 18.3 5.0
6 29.9 37.6 37.6 25.4 35.0 43.7 17.3 19.8 37.6 8.6 12.2 33.0 7.1 25.4 36.0 20.8 30.5 20.0
8 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.6 3.6 5.2 2.6 3.1 3.6 1.5 1.5 4.1 1.0 2.6 4.6 1.5 2.1 3.0
9 10.3 13.9 13.9 8.8 12.9 18.6 4.6 5.7 13.4 5.2 6.7 13.9 1.5 10.8 14.9 11.9 12.9 25.5
10 24.7 32.5 32.5 22.2 30.4 40.7 13.9 16.0 32.0 9.3 11.3 29.4 8.2 24.2 33.0 21.1 29.4 56.0
Unconditional probab. 81.3 87.5 87.5 68.8 81.3 100.0 50.0 56.3 81.3 31.3 37.5 68.8 31.3 68.8 93.8 18.8 56.3
Unconditional 
probability
bank index return 2 weeks  bank index return 1 month  bank index return 3 months  gdp deviation from hp trend normalised real interbank rate normalised 10Y-3M sov. spread
abnormal return 2 weeks
abnormal return 3 months
equity/total assets   
Historical joint probability of different triggers combinations
Country = Japan; Frequency = monthly (with no duplication)
Macro trigger
return on equity  
tier 1 ratio   
total capital ratio   
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Table 5 – Panel H 
Micro trigger value: -4.9 -3.7 -2.5 -10 -7.5 -5 -20 -15 -10 -1.5 -1 0 1.25 1 0.75 1.5 1.2 0.9
-6 1.7 3.5 3.5 2.6 3.5 4.3 1.7 4.3 4.3 6.1 8.7 12.2 12.2 19.1 5.2 7.0 13.0 28.7
-4 5.2 10.4 10.4 3.5 5.2 9.6 6.1 9.6 13.9 11.3 13.9 26.1 1.7 23.5 40.0 7.0 15.7 27.8 60.0
-2 14.8 21.7 25.2 7.0 10.4 22.6 8.7 13.0 20.9 16.5 20.9 47.0 4.3 40.9 68.7 23.5 35.7 58.3 99.1
-10 0.8 2.5 3.4 0.8 1.7 2.5 1.7 3.4 4.2 4.2 4.2 6.7 0.8 3.4 9.2 0.8 4.2 6.7 16.0
-7.5 4.2 5.9 6.7 2.5 3.4 5.0 1.7 5.9 8.4 5.9 7.6 13.4 0.8 6.7 17.6 3.4 8.4 13.4 31.9
-5 8.4 14.3 15.1 5.9 9.2 13.4 6.7 10.1 16.0 13.4 19.3 33.6 1.7 21.0 37.0 12.6 19.3 34.5 63.0
-20 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 4.8
-15 0.8 2.4 0.8 0.8 2.4 2.4 2.4 4.8 8.1 9.7 4.0 4.8 5.6 14.5
-10 4.0 8.9 11.3 1.6 2.4 4.8 0.8 4.0 6.5 9.7 15.3 16.9 27.4 9.7 12.9 16.9 39.5
2 4.7 5.6 8.1 0.9 3.4 5.6 1.3 1.3 5.1 4.6 4.6 9.2 0.8 4.2 7.1 4.6 6.3 7.9 1.3
3 6.8 8.5 11.5 1.7 4.3 8.5 2.1 2.1 6.8 5.0 5.0 10.4 0.8 6.7 10.4 5.8 7.5 9.6 3.1
4 9.0 11.5 15.4 3.0 6.8 11.1 3.4 3.4 9.4 6.3 6.3 12.5 1.7 9.6 14.2 6.7 9.6 12.1 5.3
-22.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.3
-12.5 3.2 3.2 3.6 1.4 1.8 3.2 1.8 1.8 3.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.6 3.1 0.9 1.3 2.2 2.7
-7 4.1 4.1 4.5 1.4 2.3 4.1 1.8 1.8 3.6 2.2 2.2 2.2 3.1 4.0 1.3 2.2 3.1 2.7
4 0.5
5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 5.0
6 2 . 12 . 83 . 40 . 71 . 42 . 10 . 70 . 71 . 4 0 . 7 0 . 72 . 03 . 41 . 42 . 02 . 0 2 0 . 0
8 3.0
9 1.3 1.3 1.9 0.6 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.9 1.3 1.9 1.9 25.5
10 5.2 8.4 12.3 2.6 5.2 2.6 3.9 3.2 5.8 12.3 6.5 9.0 9.0 56.0
Unconditional probab. 49.6 67.9 86.3 12.1 36.7 61.7 18.3 18.3 49.2 24.6 24.6 60.4 12.1 55.0 79.6 37.1 49.6 61.3
abnormal return 2 weeks
equity/total assets   
return on equity  
bank index return 3 months  bank index return 1 month  bank index return 2 weeks 
abnormal return 1 month
abnormal return 3 months
total capital ratio   
tier 1 ratio   
Macro trigger
Historical joint probability of different triggers combinations
Country = Canada; Frequency = monthly (with no duplication)
Unconditional 
probability
gdp deviation from hp trend normalised real interbank rate normalised 10Y-3M sov. spread
 